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The mitigated strictness of article 1.015 of the civil procedure code – the balance between legal certainty and access to justice

RC: 138413
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SILVA, Beatriz Bacci da [1]

SILVA, Beatriz Bacci da. The mitigated strictness of article 1.015 of the civil procedure code – the balance between legal certainty and access to justice. Revista Científica Multidisciplinar Núcleo do Conhecimento. Year. 07, Ed. 04, Vol. 04, pp. 114-128. April 2022. ISSN: 2448-0959, Access link: https://www.nucleodoconhecimento.com.br/law/civil-procedure

ABSTRACT

Faced with the thesis of mitigated taxation adopted by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ)[2] regarding the hypotheses of the applicability of the interlocutory appeal of article 1.015 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)[3] of 2015, in theory, a strong clash ended doctrinal and jurisprudential information on how to interpret the aforementioned article. However, the question is: would this position act as a balance between the principles of legal certainty and access to justice, reaching the ideal point of balance? Therefore, the objective is to demonstrate whether the interpretation given to article 1.015 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Superior Court of Justice contributed as a mechanism for balancing the principles of legal certainty and access to justice, without harming too much either of them. Therefore, this work will analyze the context that involved the doctrinal and jurisprudential discussion about the interpretation of article 1.015, verifying, in the end, if the thesis adopted by the Superior Court of Justice promoted the desired balance to the interpretation of the device. A survey was also carried out based on the bibliographic review method, with the contributions of authors such as Didier Jr. (2017), Câmara (2017) and Ferreira (2017), among others. It was concluded that the superior court, by adopting the thesis of mitigated taxation, ensured access to justice, making it clear that article 1.015 of the CPC does not entail a restrictive interpretation, even if this means less legal certainty.

Keywords: Civil Procedural Law, Interlocutory Appeal, Mitigated Taxation, Legal Security, Access to Justice.

INTRODUCTION

The present work aims to demonstrate whether the interpretation given to article 1.015 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) contributed as a balancing mechanism between the principles of legal certainty and access to justice, without harming too much either of them. The debate about the nature of the article’s role began as soon as the new legislation was inaugurated, which significantly changed the hypotheses of the applicability of the interlocutory appeal in relation to the previous diploma (Código de Processo Civil de 1973).

As mentioned, the chances of filing the interlocutory appeal were limited, which generated an intense controversy in the literature and in the jurisprudence about how the nature of this list of Article 1015 should be interpreted, creating an impasse and a problem for legal operators. If, on the one hand, there were those who defended an exhaustive interpretation of the article – in defense of legal certainty – on the other, there were those who wanted to expand the list of hypotheses – in the name of access to justice.

Faced with such a discussion, the central question that served to support this study was posed, since in this context it was possible to notice the emergence of antagonistic paths for the interpretation of article 1.015, causing the debate to reach the STJ, which decided on the mitigated taxation of the norm. Thus, the question is: would this position act as a balance between the principles of legal certainty and access to justice, reaching the ideal point of balance?

In a simple analysis of the question posed, it is evident that a restrictive interpretation of the law would preserve the legal soundness, but could fail to guarantee effective judicial assistance by excluding cases of necessary provisions due to procedural impossibility. On the other hand, the excessive increase of appeal hypotheses would create obstacles to the efficient process and with a reasonable duration, which would also harm the ideal of due process, in its material aspect.

However, seeking to pacify the discussion and solve the problems arising from the uncertainty regarding the interlocutory appeal, the STJ decided that art. 1.015 of the CPC would be mitigated, allowing some flexibility for the filing of the appeal when verified the urgency resulting from the uselessness of the judgment of the issue in the appeal, which balanced the dissonant positions on the subject and responding to the initial question.

In order to achieve the initial objective, the bibliographic review method was used, with detailed immersion in materials already published in the literature and analysis of judgments of the Superior Court of Justice.

DEVELOPMENT

The Civil Procedure Code of 2015, imbued with the aim of simplifying the resources, brought in Article 1015 (BRASIL, 2015) the cases that, due to their relevance, would authorize the challenge of the decision by means of an interlocutory appeal. Other cases that are not listed in the article should follow the logic established in art. 1009, paragraph 1 of the CPC (BRASIL, 2015).

Thus, the new legislation opted for a more fluid process, with less nonconformity and reforms. In the same sense, a good part of the doctrine was positioned on the occasion of the promulgation of the Code, as can be seen in the exposition by Alexandre Câmara (2017):

No sistema do CPC este fenômeno se manifesta no caso das decisões interlocutórias não agraváveis. Como se poderá ver melhor adiante, admite-se um recurso denominado agravo de instrumento contra as decisões interlocutórias enumeradas no art. 1.015. Contra as decisões interlocutórias que não se encontrem naquele rol (ou em algum outro dispositivo que afirme expressamente ser determinada decisão interlocutória recorrível por agravo de instrumento) não se admite o agravo de instrumento mas, uma vez proferida a sentença, a apelação que venha a ser interposta poderá impugnar também a decisão interlocutória que, anteriormente proferida, não podia ser atacada por recurso em separado (art. 1.009, § 1o). (CÂMARA, 2017, p. 422)

Thus, it is possible to note that the legislator sought to adjust the estoppel system for interlocutory decisions in order to make it compatible with the reduction of the chances of applicability of the interlocutory appeal in relation to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973 (BRASIL, 1973).

Moving on to the analysis of the device that provides for the possibility of interlocutory appeal, the wording of the caput of article 1015 (BRASIL, 2015), leads to the understanding that the appropriateness of the referred appeal would be limited to the situations listed in its items.

Despite the literalness of the norm under discussion, several cases began to appear in the Judiciary in which such hypotheses of appropriateness were questioned, leading to an intense doctrinal and jurisprudential debate on the subject and to a division of the doctrine into three different currents of interpretation.

For supporters of the first current, led by jurists such as Fernando Gajardoni et al. (2015, p. 447), the role of art. 1.015 would be absolutely exhaustive and, therefore, should be interpreted in a restrictive way, since the legislator would have consciously opted for the exhaustive enumeration of appropriate situations. Thus, it would not be possible to expand this list, under penalty of compromising the entire preclusive system adopted by the CPC (BRASIL, 2015).

One of the arguments that support this position is found in the records of the processing of the bill that became the 2015 Code, PLC 8046/2010 (Chamber of Deputies) and PLS 166/2010 (Federal Senate).

This is because, the Temporary Committee of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Senate, when making considerations about Amendment nº 92 that sought to expand the hypotheses of the applicability of the interlocutory appeal, authored by Senator Aloysio Nunes Ferreira (PSDB/SP), clarified that:

O objetivo desses ajustes seria afastar o regime da taxatividade das hipóteses de cabimento do agravo de instrumento, a fim de garantir que qualquer decisão interlocutória desafie esse recurso. […] Óbice regimental opõe-se à supracitada emenda. A taxatividade das hipóteses de cabimento do agravo de instrumento foi aprovada pelo Senado Federal na forma do art. 969 do PLS. A Câmara dos Deputados apenas acresceu novas hipóteses e ajustou a redação de outras previstas pelo Senado Federal, mediante ajustes constantes do art. 1.028 do SCD. Suprimir a taxatividade do cabimento do agravo de instrumento é incorrer em inovação legislativa não autorizada nessa etapa derradeira do processo legislativo. Rejeita-se, pois, a emenda em referência. (SENADO FEDERAL, 2014, p. 39/40)

Therefore, this is the main reason why the first current understands that the list of Article 1015 would be numerus clausulus and would not admit extensive interpretation or analogy, since, even after several discussions about the bill, legislators would have chosen to restrict the cases in which the appeal would be applicable.

On the other hand, jurists who adopt the second current, such as Didier Jr. and Cunha (2018); Wambier (2016), Bueno (2015), understood that the list listed by the device would be exhaustive, but that it would admit extensive interpretation or analogy, since art. 1.015 could not be considered in its literality and its items should be interpreted extensively in order to admit similar situations.

Following this line, Câmara (2017, p. 527) also concludes that the aforementioned article has a exhaustive, but not exhaustive, role, as it understands that there is a closing clause in item XIII that opens the possibility for other legal provisions to provide for other cases of appropriateness of instrument grievance.

In addition, the author states that “taxivity is not to be confused with the prohibition of interpretation, which, many times, cannot be literal, under penalty of building a truly schizophrenic legal system” (C MARA, 2017, p. 530) . It would be possible, therefore, for the court to interpret the items of article 1.015 in order to cover the situations specified by law, however, using the reverse logic of the device, as in the case of item X, for example,

[…] não há sentido em admitir agravo de instrumento contra a decisão que revoga o efeito suspensivo anteriormente deferido aos embargos do executado e não admitir a interposição dessa mesma espécie recursal contra a decisão interlocutória que indefere a atribuição de efeito suspensivo aos embargos do executado. Pois também esta decisão deve ser reputada agravável. (CÂMARA, 2017, p. 529)

In this sense, according to Bustamante cited by Becker (2017, p. 247), extensive interpretation must be kept “within the limits semantically established by the text object of interpretation”, so that it does not create hypotheses, meanings or logic that do not exist in the legal text.

Furthermore, the considerations of Fredie Didier Jr. (2017) on the subject, according to which, in the Brazilian legal system, there are several examples in which the exhaustive enumeration is interpreted extensively, such as the list of services subject to the Tax on Services of Any Nature (ISS)[4].

The author informs that this list, although exhaustive, admits extensive interpretation to encompass services of the same nature, but with different nomenclature. Consequently, it states that this same mechanism could also be applicable to the cases in which an interlocutory appeal provided for in the CPC is appropriate and that, if the extensive interpretation to the device is not adopted, “there is a risk of resurrecting the anomalous and excessive use of the instrument” writ of mandamus against a judicial act, which is much worse, including in terms of judicial policy” (DIDIER Jr., 2017, p. 211).

Finally, the third and last interpretative current, defended by authors such as William Santos Ferreira (2017) and José Rogério Cruz and Tucci (2017), understands that art. 1.015 of the CPC (BRASIL, 2015) would be an example, so that the appealability of the interlocutory decision should be immediate, even if the situation is not foreseen by the norm.

From this perspective, when considering the different positions of the doctrine on the subject, Ferreira (2017) considers that there would be a premise error in the reasoning of the other two understandings about the strictness of article 1.015 of the CPC. So there is

um equívoco comum que parece estar sendo cometido, é a precipitação na criação de pelo menos duas correntes, uma defendendo que a enumeração legal indica taxatividade e não cabendo agravo somente há que se ralar em apelação e se houver urgência deve ser admitida a impetração de mandado de segurança, enquanto outra corrente vem apresentando o que parte da doutrina denomina de ‘analogia’, procurando diante de situações de mutilidade da apelação identificar ‘similitudes’ indutoras da leitura ampliativa das hipóteses legais de cabimento, como, por exemplo, rejeição de preliminar de incompetência ser analogicamente identificada à hipótese de rejeição da alegação de convenção de arbitragem (art. 1.015, lll). (FERREIRA, 2017, p. 197)

In view of this, in the author’s view, what must be observed for the suitability of the appeal, based on a systemic interpretation of the Code of Civil Procedure of 2015, is the fulfillment of the requirements of the appellate interest and the risk of futility of future challenge of the decision on preliminary appeal.

This is because, again according to Ferreira (2017), in the Brazilian civil procedural system, which CPC/2015 inaugurated, the criterion of full appealability of interlocutory decisions was elected, only varying the appeal, interlocutory appeal or, residually, appeal. In this way,

algo que não pode ser esquecido é que para todo recurso impõe-se interesse recursal, sendo este não apenas um requisito do recurso sem o qual não é admissível, mas também é um direito do recorrente em relação ao Estado, uma vez identificada recorribilidade em lei, deve ser assegurada a utilidade do Julgamento do recurso, inclusive em estrita observância do inc. XXXV do art. 5°, da CF/1988. Se não há identificação literal das hipóteses legalmente previstas para agravo de instrumento, em primeiro momento, se defenderia a apelação, contudo se o seu julgamento futuro será inútil por impossibilidade de resultado prático pleno (ex. dano irreparável ou de difícil reparação), como no caso de uma perícia inadmitida, em que o prédio que seria objeto da perícia diante de uma desapropriação será rapidamente demolido, desaparecendo a utilidade de julgamento futuro da apelação, não é possível defender-se o cabimento da apelação, porque a lei não pode prever recurso inútil, logo é caso de cabimento do agravo de instrumento. Em outras palavras, há uma taxatividade fraca […]. (FERREIRA, 2017, p. 199)

Faced with this huge doctrinal discussion, the issue reached the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) which faced the issue in the judgments of Special Appeals nº 1,696,396 and nº 1,704,520, submitted to the systematic of repetitive appeals that resulted in Theme 988.

The rapporteur for the cases, Minister Nancy Andrighi (BRASIL, 2018), immediately ruled out the possibility of an exhaustive interpretation of Article 1015, as she understood that it would not be possible for the legislator to foresee in the legal text all the situations in which an interlocutory decision should be taken to the examination of the 2nd degree of jurisdiction. This is because, in the words of the Minister:

o estudo da história do direito também revela que um rol que pretende ser taxativo raramente enuncia todas as hipóteses vinculadas a sua razão de existir, pois a realidade normalmente supera a ficção e a concretude torna letra morta o exercício de abstração inicialmente realizado pelo legislador. Assim ocorreu com o CPC/39, que foi duramente criticado pela doutrina nesse particular durante toda a sua vigência porque, não raro, surgiam hipóteses imprevistas e, pela lei, irrecorríveis de imediato, causando sérios prejuízos às partes e demandando dos especialistas a criação de uma anomalia – o mandado de segurança contra ato judicial […] (BRASIL, STJ. REsp nº 1.696.396/MT, Rel. Min. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

Having overcome this clarification, the judgment also rejects the extensive interpretation or by analogy, due to the absence of a safe and isonomic parameter capable of establishing the limits that must be respected in the analysis of each case provided for by law. This type of interpretation, like the restrictive interpretation, does not encompass all situations that require immediate reexamination.

Lastly, the rapporteur clarifies that the understanding that the role of article 1.015 of the CPC is merely exemplary does not deserve to prosper, since a consequence of this interpretation would be the restatement of article 522, caput, of the 1973 Code of Civil Procedure (BRASIL , 1973), which directly contradicts the conscious choice made by the legislator to limit the management of the resource.

Faced with the inapplicability of these interpretative currents presented by the doctrine, it began to be questioned what would be the correct interpretation of that article, in order to preserve the postulates of legal certainty and access to justice. The answer found by the Superior Court was the so-called mitigated taxation, as explained below.

According to the vote of the rapporteur minister (BRASIL, 2018), the interlocutory appeal is based on the urgency arising from the future uselessness of the judgment of the deferred appeal. That is, what justifies the reexamination of an interlocutory decision by a higher court is the need for a swift reforming provision. Therefore, once the damage to the party has already occurred due to the impossibility of filing an interlocutory appeal, it would be pointless to raise such a question in the preliminary appeal.

To exemplify: the decisions that reject the request for secrecy of justice or that deal with questions related to competence – sometimes questions absent from the list foreseen by the legislator. If these matters are not immediately subject to appeal, even if raised in a preliminary appeal, the subsequent decision that reverses this situation will be completely useless, since the process will have already taken place in a public manner or under the tutelage of an incompetent court.

According to the Minister’s understanding (BRASIL, 2018), it is situations such as these, not covered by the law, that the Judiciary must supply with its interpretation. Therefore, urgency is “the element that should guide any interpretations related to the appropriateness of the interlocutory appeal outside the hypotheses listed in art. 1.015 of the CPC”. (BRASIL, STJ. REsp No. 1.696.396/MT, Justice Rel. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

From another perspective, it is important to mention that procedural norms should not be analyzed in isolation. On the contrary, as it is a branch of public law, such norms must be considered part of a legal framework as a whole, since the system is one. Therefore, it was understood that

o direito processual deve sempre ser lido e interpretado à luz do texto constitucional. A Constituição Federal, pois, não pode estar em outros locais senão na base e simultaneamente no vértice do sistema processual, devendo todas as regras pertencentes a esse sistema serem interpretadas tendo-a como fundamento de validade e, ao mesmo tempo, como fonte normativa maior a que se deve respeito. (BRASIL, STJ. REsp nº 1.696.396/MT, Rel. Min. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

It is for this reason that the Civil Procedure Code of 2015 makes room to establish as a fundamental rule, right in its first article, that the interpretation of the civil procedural system must be given from the perspective of the Constitution of the Republic. In this way, the interpreter should not deviate from the constitutional text, since it is these metanorms of civil procedure that allow the Superior Court of Justice to consider and exercise broad control over the most appropriate interpretation of legal provisions, based on the dictates extracted by normative force of the Constitution.

However, in the judgment under discussion, it was concluded that there was a clear position adopted by the legislator when disposing of the interlocutory appeal, which is evident in the explanatory memorandum of the civil procedural codification and in the various manifestations of the parliamentarians during the processing of the bill in the National Congress, which made a political-legislative choice to restrict the use of the interlocutory appeal.

Therefore, it was based on the objective criterion of urgency, on the possibility of futility of a subsequent judgment and on the interpretation according to the will of the legislator that the thesis was signed, according to which, “the list of art. 1.015 of the CPC is of mitigated taxation, therefore it admits the filing of an interlocutory appeal when verified the urgency resulting from the uselessness of the judgment of the matter in the appeal” (BRASIL, STJ. REsp No. 1.696.396/MT, Justice Rel. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

Notably, during the trial, a problem was raised about the mitigated taxation: the damage to the estoppel system of the appealability of decisions. In this sense, it is necessary to remember that the CPC of 2015 considerably modified the estoppel regime for interlocutory decisions. So much so that, with regard to the appeal under discussion, only decisions not contested by interlocutory appeal and whose content is described in the list of article 1.015 (BRASIL, 2015) are precluded. The other issues remain immune until the judgment is handed down, at which time they may be raised in a preliminary appeal and, otherwise, the matter will become uncontroversial.

At this point, the criticism of the thesis of mitigated taxation consists in the fact that it expands the hypotheses of the applicability of the interlocutory appeal and, therefore, the new decisions that can be targeted by means of the interlocutory appeal end up precluding immediately. Thus, this could be harmful to the parties in situations where, believing in the strictness of article 1.015 of the CPC, they could not even foresee the possibility of filing an appeal and be surprised, in the future, by not knowing the issue on appeal or counterarguments, so which could generate legal uncertainty and hinder access to justice.

However, for Minister Nancy Andrighi (BRASIL, 2018), this would only be an apparent problem, as the proposed thesis does not have the power to change any kind of estoppel, whether temporal, logical or consummative. Therefore, once the thesis of mitigated taxation is applied, there would be no temporal estoppel, but rather the anticipation of the moment for exceptionally reviewing the decision, without extending the term, thus respecting the time of the appeal or the counterarguments.

According to the Minister (BRASIL, 2018), in this case there will also be no need to talk about logical estoppel, since

a decisão interlocutória fora da lista do art. 1.015, em tese não impugnável de imediato, está momentaneamente imune. Nessa perspectiva, somente por intermédio de uma conduta ativa da parte – ato comissivo – é que se poderá, eventualmente e se preenchido o seu requisito, desestabilizar a questão, retirando-a do estado de espera que a própria lei a colocou e permitindo que seja examinada imediatamente. (BRASIL, STJ. REsp nº 1.696.396/MT, Rel. Min. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

Finally, it argues that the consummative estoppel will not occur, given that the state of inertia of the decision will only be broken if, in addition to the filing of the appeal by the aggrieved party, there is also a positive judgment of admissibility by the Court. Thus, the Minister summarizes the issue of preclusion:

Dito de outra maneira, o cabimento do agravo de instrumento na hipótese de haver urgência no reexame da questão em decorrência da inutilidade do julgamento diferido do recurso de apelação está sujeito a um duplo juízo de conformidade: um, da parte, que interporá o recurso com a demonstração de seu cabimento excepcional; outro, do Tribunal, que reconhecerá a necessidade de reexame com o juízo positivo de admissibilidade. Somente nessa hipótese a questão, quando decidida, estará acobertada pela preclusão. (BRASIL, STJ. REsp nº 1.696.396/MT, Rel. Min. Nancy Andrighi, 2018).

Having overcome the main criticisms of the solution given by the Superior Court of Justice to the issue of the exhaustiveness of the list of article 1.015 of the CPC, the thesis contained in Theme 988 of the Superior Court was then signed: “the list of art. 1.015 of the CPC is of mitigated taxation, therefore it admits the filing of an interlocutory appeal when verified the urgency resulting from the uselessness of the judgment of the matter in the appeal” (BRASIL, STJ. Topic 988, 2018).

Thus, it remains undeniable that the court, in a judgment signed under the perspective of binding precedent, resolved a stir that afflicted the legal community, with the most diverse notions about the interpretation that should be applied. Such a response from the Judiciary was extremely necessary because it is an issue that is so present in forensic everyday life.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Civil Procedure Code of 2015, compared to the previous codification, underwent several changes. One of them, quite evident, is related to the appealability system for interlocutory decisions. In this sense, safeguarding some legal hypotheses, the interlocutory appeal began to be used as a means of contesting only the interlocutory decisions that were explicitly contained in the list of article 1.015 of the CPC.

However, despite the restriction imposed by the legal provision on the hypotheses of the applicability of the interlocutory appeal, a doctrinal and jurisprudential discussion began to define the character of the list listed by the article. Thus, we sought to understand which would be the best interpretation to be given.

Faced with this question, possible interpretations were formulated for the article by doctrine and jurisprudence, which led to the emergence of three main interpretative currents to elucidate the nature of the enumeration of article 1,015 of the CPC. As seen, the first defends that the role is numerus clausus; the second that the list is exhaustive, but would admit extensive interpretation or analogy; and the third that the role is merely exemplary.

It is possible to observe that the three currents exposed here, to a greater or lesser extent, were based on the technique and legal science developed by previous systems, notably the 1939 Code and the 1973 Code. It is evident that previous experiences build and condition the reasoning and behavior of legal operators. So much so that part of the doctrine considered the return of the writ of mandamus as an appeal substitute, which was rejected by the vote of Minister Nancy Andrighi on the occasion of the judgment of Special Appeal 1.696.396/MT.

In addition, the judgment of Special Appeals 1,696,396 and 1,704,520, submitted to the systematic of repetitive appeals, which represents an advance with regard to the judgment technique, points to a new paradigm in the interpretation of norms and the Brazilian legal system as a whole.

The decision that the role of article 1015 is one of specificity mitigated by urgency is compatible with current references and, at least in theory, solves most of the problems found by the doctrine with regard to the specificity of the hypotheses of appropriateness of the interlocutory appeal instrument, which brings us back to the initial question: would this position act as a balance between the principles of legal certainty and access to justice, reaching the ideal point of balance?

Despite apparently solving such problems, the thesis adopted by the Superior Court is still the target of criticism, which would be natural whatever the position adopted by the Court, since the existing positions are quite different from each other. The answer found by the superior court establishes in a relatively adequate way the situations that forensic practice has already found to be indispensable to the filing of an interlocutory appeal, aiming to prevent the loss of the invoked right.

It is not denied, however, such a position leaves a margin of legal uncertainty, given that it will be up to the interpreter to glimpse the issues that can wait for the regular development of the process to be contested and the issues that need an immediate response by way of appeal, which would directly influence the postulate of access to justice.

Thus, it is the circumstances of the specific case that will define the ideal moment for whether or not to file an appeal, requiring good faith – in terms of what the code itself proposes – of all operators of law in the name of due process of law.

Therefore, mitigated taxation is the means of interpreting article 1.015 of the CPC, which guarantees, as a rule, the limiting interpretation of the device, supported by constitutional principles to be considered by the operator of the law and by the Judiciary, except when there is a risk to the best judicial provision if wait for the regular procedural procedure for subsequent challenge in the appeal route.

It is also ensured that the thesis does not contradict the intention of the law, but actually meets it when it seeks excellence in the provision by the Judiciary in the defense of legal interests – as required by the Constitution. The intermediate doctrine on the possible positions to be adopted was the winner in this debate, increasingly balancing the values of security, efficiency and access to the judiciary.

Based on the premise that it would not be feasible to foresee all cases of filing the grievance and that it is up to the Judiciary to interpret the norms, the understanding conferred by the superior court meets the logic of procedural legislation, insofar as there is no extension of appeal cases , as in the past procedural system, but without becoming an obstacle to judicial action regarding any injury or threat of injury to the right, precisely considering and balancing the guiding principles of the present work.

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DIDIER JR., Fredie; CUNHA, Leonardo Carneiro da. Curso de Direito Processual Civil: meios de impugnação às decisões judiciais e processos nos tribunais. 15ª ed. Salvador: Juspodivm, 2018.

FERREIRA, William Santos. Cabimento do agravo de instrumento e a ótica prospectiva da utilidade – O direito ao interesse na recorribilidade de decisões interlocutórias. Revista de Processo nº 263, São Paulo: RT, jan. 2017. Disponível em: <https://www.academia.edu/36054360>. Acesso em: 17/06/2021.

GAJARDONI, Fernando da Fonseca; DELLORE, Luiz; ROQUE, André Vasconcelos; OLIVEIRA JR., Zulmar. Teoria geral do processo: comentários ao CPC de 2015. São Paulo: Forense, 2015, p. 447.

SENADO FEDERAL. Parecer nº 956, de 2014, da Comissão Temporária do Código de Processo Civil, sobre o Substitutivo da Câmara dos Deputados (SCD) ao Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS) nº 166, de 2010, que estabelece o Código de Processo Civil. Disponível em: <https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg-getter/documento?dm=4202793>. Acesso em: 19/06/2021

TUCCI, José Rogério Cruz e. Ampliação do cabimento do recurso de agravo de instrumento.  Disponível em: <https://www.conjur.com.br/2017-jul-18/paradoxo-corte-ampliacao-cabimento-recurso-deagravo-instrumento>. Acesso em: 16/06/2021.

WAMBIER, Teresa Arruda Alvim et al. Primeiros comentários ao novo Código de Processo Civil: artigo por artigo. 2ª Ed. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2016.

APPENDIX – FOOTNOTE

2. Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ).

3. Código de Processo Civil (CPC).

4. Imposto Sobre Serviços (ISS).

[1] Post Graduated in Administrative Law and Civil Procedural Law from Universidade Cândido Mendes and Bachelor of Law from the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro – PUC-Rio. ORCID: 0000-0002-4850-6778.

Submitted: December, 2021.

Approved: April, 2022.

5/5 - (6 votes)
Beatriz Bacci da Silva

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